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 Editors’ Introduction 
 




An overview of the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
hermeneutics. We would like to open this introduction by confessing an 
initial ambition that we now see with a more critical eye. The idea that 
initially prompted the construction of this issue of Critical Hermeneutics 
was to rethink in a systematic way the relationship between these two 
disciplines that have constantly but ambivalently attracted each other, 
perhaps since the birth of the younger one: psychoanalysis. 
However, we realised that the goal of a systematic review of the 
relationship between hermeneutics and psychoanalysis is not yet 
feasible. There are too many directions that can be given to reflection. 
The works that have arrived – and which we will briefly present in 
the next paragraph – testify precisely to this polyphony of voices, 
sometimes dissonant, but fertile and innovative. Indeed, by moving in 
so many different directions – from clinic to art, from historiography to 
phenomenology, from ethics to textual analysis – the resulting picture 
contributes to broadening perspectives, but also suggests the epoché 
of any possible claim to synthesis. 
However, it is still appropriate to ask what are the fundamental 
assumptions that legitimise and make necessary, today more than 
yesterday, the dialogue between hermeneutics and psychoanalysis. 




psychiatry conference about their relationship with hermeneutics: 
although both disciplines are dedicated to understanding, it is not so 
much this that distinguishes them, but the common interest in what 
escapes understanding itself. 
First of all, psychoanalysis can be included entirely in the field of 
hermeneutics, since language and the construction of meaning are 
strictly linked to the affective/emotional transformations they aim to 
activate. As Ricoeur (1988) states, analytic treatment is possible 
because affectivity is not foreign to language and consists in bringing 
into language what has been excluded from it. 
It seems to us that this may allow us to understand the 
relationship between the two disciplines in a new way, beyond certain 
misunderstandings that weighed on the reception of hermeneutics in 
the psychoanalytic field in the last decades of the last century. We refer 
to hermeneutic relativism (the opposition between narrative truth and 
historical truth, the very denial of the existence of a historical past, the 
absolutisation of the creation of meaning) and coherentism, which sees 
in hermeneutics the aspiration to a clear and systematic interpretation, 
without deviations. In the first case, hermeneutics has been flattened 
into narrativism, which ignores the importance of history and psychic 
reality, but which is completely alien to many important authors from 
Pareyson to Betti, from Ricoeur to Gadamer himself. In the second, on 
the other hand, hermeneutics is considered within the specific 
paradigm of “strong” narration, with which it has very little to do, given 
the constant recognition and enhancement of inachèvement. 
Also in this sense, Paul Ricoeur’s reflection is theoretically 
balanced and fruitful for clinical work, where he argues that the 
narrative function can sometimes consist in “thickening, in increasing 
opacity, that is, in referring to mystery but still through language” 
(Ricoeur 1986a; our translation). It is clear that such a definition of 




narrative implies also, or perhaps above all, the language of the 
fragment, of the poetic word, of the inachevé. 
With these clarifications, it is then possible to fully reaffirm the 
centrality of language, but at the same time to stop seeing it in 
opposite terms to the non-verbal sphere (relation, empathy, 
containment, etc.) on which psychoanalysis of the last fifty years has 
focused so much. Hans Loewald, a psychoanalyst who has thought a 
lot about language, quotes Paul Valery, when the poet says that 
language force us to be rather than to understand, and then comments 
that this is what happens during the most productive moments of the 
psychoanalytic session (Loewald 1980). 
We think that in order to account for the hermeneutic status of 
psychoanalysis, it is necessary today for psychoanalysts to reflect on 
the contributions of continental philosophy; at the same time it is 
important for philosophers to pay attention to the reconceptualisation 
of the idea of the unconscious that has widely traversed psychoanalysis 
over the last fifty years and has more recently met with that of 
neuroscience, which has contributed to defining what is included under 
the term of the unrepressed unconscious. 
As Ricoeur puts it in a fundamental passage of his last interview 
on psychoanalysis il y a un intraduisible devant la traduction et il y a 
un intraduisible produit et révélé par la traduction (Ricoeur 2003: 108). 
This is in a way the essence of the psychoanalytic process: to interpret 
not for the sole purpose of clarifying and thus concluding, but also to 
augment the untranslatable, to enhance the unrepresentable 
foundation of the unconscious. 
In psychoanalysis, the hermeneutic circle first of all declines 
precisely in the dialectic between representation and the 
unrepresentable. Accessing one of these two dimensions is not valuable 
in itself, but – above all – as a gateway to the other. Through 




dimension of unrepresentability of the human mind, especially in its 
creative and symbolic values. At the same time, by connecting with the 
unrepresentable, mainly on a sensory and emotional level, we can 
encourage the emergence of new representations.   
This introduces us to a dialectical conception of psychoanalysis. In 
the essay De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud (1965) Paul Ricoeur 
identifies such a dialectical movement in the circle between 
archaeology and teleology, thus distancing psychoanalysis from the 
«philosophies of suspicion», but also freeing it from a rigid link with its 
metapsychological roots. He thus inaugurated a path that only years 
later would lead within the psychoanalytic movement to a diffusion of 
the concepts of intersubjectivity, relation, interaction and, finally, of 
translation, which is also the expression of Ricoeur’s last paradigm of 
hermeneutics (Jervolino 2001). 
 
Note to the contributions in this issue. Let us now take a brief overview 
at the contributions collected in this issue. In Truth at the Corssroads 
Between Internal and External Reality Giuseppe Martini presents an 
exhaustive analysis of the problem of truth in the analytic experience 
and, with reference to Pareyson, he states from the outset, as a 
fundamental axiom, that truth only appears within interpretation, but 
that at the same time interpretation can only be directed towards truth. 
Now, is truth therapeutic? And if so, when and in what way?, the author 
asks. The clinic teaches that there are powerful forces that oppose 
head-on the discovery/construction of truth: the desire not to know, 
supported by the death drive that usually feeds suffering. It should also 
be added that psychoanalysis is concerned with an emotional truth, not 
a cognitive one. Adopting a hermeneutic attitude, Martini stresses that 
what is fundamental is the translational function of the analyst: 
“l’analista traduce lingusticamente le emozioni del paziente e questi a 
sua volta converte in ‘materia affettiva’ l’interpretazione dell’analista”. 




The article demonstrates the impossibility of separating the concepts 
of truth and internal – psychic – and external reality. Hence the 
pertinent questions that insist: “A quale realtà si volge la verità? Che 
cosa è la realtà e cosa la realtà interna?”  The author adheres – and 
rightly so – to the perspectives that affirm that the analytical process 
implies a continuous co-creative construction. But here the 
philosophical perspectives on the problem of reality are not neglected, 
quite the contrary. Relying on Ricoeur, the author dwells on the knot 
between reality and history, a problematic that is also central to the 
analytic cure, especially in relation to the concept of trauma in 
transference we might say, where the present and the past overlap, 
resignifying each other. Ricoeur’s concepts allow the author to dispel 
any reductionism, while at the same time maintaining the 
insurmountable ambiguity that runs through philosophy and 
historiography in terms of the accurate establishment of the concept 
of reality, which always rides between the illusion of matter and the 
illusion of fiction. Moreover, Ricoeur presents practical tools that allow 
us to understand in depth the multiple dialectical processes that sustain 
this concept, something that the author uses to support and validate 
the clinical and epistemological use of the paradigm of translation, in 
which the power of symbolisation acquires a central role. 
The question What reality is psychic reality? is still insisted on in the 
essay Psychic Reality: A Critical Perspective Between Psychoanalysis, 
Phenomenology and Hermeneutics, by Vinicio Busacchi and Ignacio 
Colillas. Although we owe to Freud the establishment of the 
Unconscious as a psychic reality from the clinical and 
psychopathological points of view—the ego is not master in its own 
house—philosophies, as discourses of a non-unitary character, “han 
contribuido tanto a la aparición y definición de la idea de inconsciente 
como a su complicación, su puesta en duda, e incluso a su negación”  




psychoanalysis – focuses mainly on two perspectives: those of Michel 
Henry and Paul Ricoeur. Henry’s phenomenology allows the authors to 
highlight the centrality of affectivity as an ontological manifestation, 
since “es la afectividad la que se revela/no se revela tras la 
representación”. Henry’s critical perspective on psychoanalysis 
“permite un interesante enfoque en clave fenomenológica sobre la 
relación entre pulsión y representación”, they explain. Henry insists on 
the fracture between Being and Representation, which is the critical 
core of his phenomenological discourse. On the other hand, Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic phenomenology allows us to take up critically the 
permanent conceptual tension between drive and representation, in 
order to be able to specify the very constitution of psychic reality. The 
essay reminds us that Freud did not apply the opposition between 
conscious and unconscious to the drive, and that the drive itself never 
comes into consciousness, but only its representation: “es decir, si no 
apareciera unida a una representación o en forma de afecto, no se 
sabría nada de ella”. And as far as the understanding of the concept of 
representation is concerned, Ricoeur gave a detailed account of this 
multiplicity of registers, and how it ‘cambia significativamente según el 
registro y el paradigma adoptado, ya sea energético, mecánico, 
estructuralista, lingüístico o hermenéutico’ – Busacchi and Colillas 
specify. 
The perspective adopted by Richard Theisen Simanke in the essay 
Preliminary Remarks On a Historical-Philosophical Method for 
Conceptual Research in Psychoanalysis: A Reflection from the Brazilian 
Experience proposes a combined application of two perspectives in 
order to consolidate a historical-philosophical method in conceptual 
research in psychoanalysis: 1) the internal structural and conceptual 
analysis of the works and 2) the historical analysis of the scientific and 
intellectual context in which these works appear, this being one of its 
most substantial contributions. This precise methodology contributes 




to the construction of a philosophy – or epistemology – of 
psychoanalysis, within the framework of the reception of 
psychoanalysis in Brazilian philosophy. In the case of Freud’s work, for 
example, a conceptual analysis undoubtedly implies a study of 19th 
century medicine, psychology and biology. The author offers, as an 
example, what Freud said about infantile sexuality. There has 
undoubtedly been a neglect of history in the field of the philosophy of 
psychoanalysis: “C’est le besoin d’un tel type d’historiographie critique 
et philosophique comme programme de recherche théorique en 
psychanalyse que l’on a essayé de suggérer ici”, the author concludes. 
From different perspectives and maintaining multiple differences, 
these three articles converge in the interrogation of the concepts of 
psychic reality, truth and history, themes that both hermeneutic 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis as a method of treatment 
(Behandlungsmethode) are concerned with. 
With the following work, Symbol and Interpretation in the Work of 
Reparation, we move from the more strictly psychoanalytical to the 
ethical field, but not without an important trait d’union. This link is 
given by the symbol, which also allows a reference to healing practices 
and, therefore, to psychoanalysis itself. If we had previously seen the 
multiform correlations of the symbol, on the one hand, with the drive 
and affectivity, on the other, with truth, psychic reality and translation, 
now its restorative value is at stake. Paolo Bettineschi underlines how 
symbolic reparation is made possible by the equation between the 
symbol and the original good object to be reconstituted. Equalisation, 
says the author “è quel rapporto che consente a due cose o due oggetti 
differenti di rimanere differenti pur essendo assunti […] come cose o 
come oggetti che possono stare in pari quanto al loro valore”. Thanks 
to the symbol, repair widens its range of possibilities, as it is “in grado 
di aumentare in maniera potenzialmente illimitata il numero degli 




quelli originari”. This also makes it possible to make the work of 
symbolic reparation more concrete. The author’s reflection thus 
translates into a firm anchorage between the idea of symbol and the 
idea of good, so that what the symbol allows is, in the final analysis, 
“in grado di aumentare in maniera potenzialmente illimitata il numero 
degli oggetti buoni che per noi valgono come nuovi o sostitutivi rispetto 
a quelli originari”. This also makes the work of symbolic reparation 
more concrete. The author’s reflection thus translates into a firm 
anchoring between the idea of symbol and the idea of good, so that 
what the symbol ultimately enables is “l’esperienza del rinnovarsi del 
bene dopo l’accadimento del male”. 
The next two contributions shift the field again: from ethics to 
aesthetics, and once again with a special focus on the symbolic. In the 
first of the two, Only the Truth Can Save Us? Cinema and the Conflict 
of Interpretations, the reflection focuses on two films that have given 
rise to much debate from a psychoanalytical and interpretative point 
of view: Shutter Island and Inception. They appear as two 
paradigmatic works of the spirit of post-modernity that, although in 
different ways, propose a radical and perhaps even shattering 
reflection on identity. Quite appropriately, Maria Teresa Pacilé 
approaches them in the light of the Ricoeurian concept of narrative 
identity and, in this way, her reflection connects with the themes of 
truth and psychic reality addressed in the first two works. Where is 
truth: in “reality” or in the dream? And is it possible to distinguish 
between the two? And again: is truth really curative, even when it has 
a traumatic value that risks rendering it indigestible? This second 
question seems more difficult to resolve than the first. Indeed, we can 
recognise that “ogni livello di realtà ha la propria autenticità” and it is 
good to “vivere la complessità della realtà polidimensionale all’interno 
della quale da sempre ci troviamo”, as Inception seems to invite us to 
do. And yet, “che ne è della verità, in questo gioco di luci ed ombre?”. 




It seems that the discovery of a highly traumatic truth, to which the 
protagonist of Shutter Island finally gains access, only generates a 
new, even more dramatic rejection of reality and of the past, which 
translates into a narrative identity that places him and us “di fronte ad 
un abisso” in which we are afraid to reflect ourselves. The author 
creatively hovers between a (therapeutic) path that leads the 
protagonist of Shutter Island out of the maze, but that does not save 
him, definitively consigning him to an inability to live, and a path that 
allows the protagonist of Inception a symbolic elaboration that 
reconnects him with the life  (with a “capacità di vivere non ostante 
tutto”). 
From film to literature there is a short step. With the subsequent “The 
Shimmer Is Inside Really”. D.H. Lawrence’s Resurrection Myth and 
Wilfred’s Bion’s Transformations in “0” Emily Griffiths aims to read the 
work of the famous English writer and his aesthetic theory centred on 
the mystery of Christian resurrection through a key offered by the 
theoretical contributions of the psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion. Here, too, 
there is a connection with one of the previous works (the fourth) insofar 
as much of the reflection revolves around the Kleinian concept of 
reparation. In fact, by using Kleinian and Bionian theories instead of 
Freudian, the author is able to move away from a paranoid reading, 
more in line with a hermeneutics of suspicion and Freudian 
metapsychology, towards a reparative reading whose idea she borrows 
from Sedgwick. This seems more in keeping with a possible function of 
Lawrence’s novels as “reparative container”:  
 
Employng Bion’s notion of epistemophilic ‘0’ demonstrates 
consonance with Lawrence’s depictions of truth in the 
resurrection myth however, as ‘0’ can only be-ed and not 
known, Lawrence’s attempt to represent this transcendent 




the hermeneutic act of ‘reparative’ criticism.  
 
In light of this, Griffiths examines three seminal works by the 
English writer, Son and Lovers, Lady Chatterey’s Lover and The Man 
who Died, to conclude that “Lawrence’s dramatization of the transition 
between paranoid-schizoid and depressive positionalities is made 
possible by the reparative, containing function of the novel”.  
The overview concludes with a paper by Sanja Ivic: The 
Significance of Paul Ricoeur’s Narrative Theory and Hermeneutics for 
the Understanding of Carl Jung’s Red Book. Indeed, as the author 
reminds us, the reference to hermeneutics is highlighted in Jung 
himself several times (unlike Freud), although he too does not seem to 
have been familiar with the major philosophers of this orientation. 
However, it is again his peculiar attention to the symbol that naturally 
leads him to privilege the interpretative aspect in the hermeneutic 
sense over the semiotic dimension and to correlate dreams and 
fantasies on the one hand, and myths and legends on the other. Ivic 
thus argues that it is possible to establish an analogy between the 
Ricoeurian innovation/sedimentation dialectic and the Jungian present 
moment/historical psyche. Hence, the author proceeds to a reading of 
The Red Book as a narrative experiment, taking into account the 
Ricoeurian idea of the interpretation of a text as an interpretation of 
the self that finds its result in narrative identity. Jung’s own emphasis 
on narrative suggests that we follow this path and understand his 
autobiographical text as ‘a narrative experiment, which expands the 
idea of plot and narration to include visions, dreams and fantasies’. 
This implicitly confirms Ricoeur’s idea of plot as a synthesis of the 
heterogeneous and, at the same time, underlines the collective and not 
only personal character of the Zurich psychoanalyst’s visionary 
experience, in line not only with the idea of the collective unconscious, 
which he will develop in his theoretical works, but also to some extent 




with Ricoeur’s conception of the literary tradition. 
 
How is the hermeneutic horizon reflected in the psychoanalyst’s clinical 
work? However, we would not like to conclude this introductory note 
without moving from text to action. That is to say: how much and how 
is a hermeneutic inspiration reflected in praxis, that is, in the clinical 
work of the psychoanalyst? 
Here another term arises that the two disciplines have in common: 
the person. 
It is up to the person to open the first horizon in which the 
encounter between psychoanalysis and hermeneutics is played out:  
 
Je reviens toujours à ma question de la souffrance, la 
souffrance insupportable et la souffrance supportable […] La 
psychanalyse nous conduit à reconnaître, dans la souffrance 
initiale, des ressources de sens qui vont faire apparaître une 
autre profondeur, et peut-être même une signification qui lui 
était initialement étrangère. A la fin, on ne souffre ni de la 
même chose, ni de la même façon. On souffre d’autre chose 
et autrement, mais d’une façon compréhensible, qui a l’unité 
d’une certaine cohérence narrative et qui permet tout 
simplement de continuer de vivre, de vivre avec les autres et 
avec soi-même comme je viens de le dire (Ricoeur 2003: 106, 
108). 
 
Is this not what distinguishes the work of the psychoanalyst and 
his or her particular link to the question of meaning? 
In line with the above, it is necessary to strongly insist that it is 
not legitimate to consider hermeneutics as a “tendency” of 
psychoanalysis, a kind of theoretical model that can be placed in 




linked to the thought of classical authors (Freud, Klein, Bion, Winnicott, 
Kouth, Lacan, etc.). Hermeneutics is rather a perspective that inspires 
the psychoanalyst, informs her or his style (both in clinical and 
theoretical reflection). Finally, if there is a specificity of hermeneutics, 
it is that of encouraging dialogue between theories and their dialectical 
confrontation. 
But above all – it has been said – it is the attention to the subject, 
to the other and to intersubjectivity and the consequent vocation for 
dialogue that both fields share. Hermeneutics strongly raises the 
question of the subject, which does not mean posing a strong subject: 
rather, it emphasises the conception of a subjectivity suspended 
between the cogito and the anticogito (Jervolino 1993) and this is 
precisely what it shares intimately with psychoanalysis. As an author 
who dialogued with Ricoeur reminds us, psychoanalysis captures the 
subject in its division, in its fragmentation, and, in turn, can give rise 
to a deconstruction, but nevertheless its aim is precisely the 
emergence of the subject (Castoriadis 1975-1990: 98). 
At this point, it is possible to attempt again a definition of 
hermeneutics that can have a significant impact on therapeutic work. 
We will start again from Paul Ricoeur, who summarises its double task 
in the reconstruction of the dynamics of the text and in the projection 
of the work to the outside in order to represent a habitable world 
(1986). 
Hermeneutics would then imply three instances: a) the search for 
meaning while respecting the text and the author’s intentions, b) the 
attribution, once this meaning has been acquired, of a further 
significance, with a view to opening up new horizons, c) the ability to 
succeed in converting this text into the representation of a world that 
our patients “can inhabit”. 
If one ignores only one of these three instances, which we could 
respectively call veritative, constructive and ethical, one can only fall 




back on the others, totally disrupting their function, which is indeed 
specific, but which occurs only in the interconnection with the other 
two. 
Taking into account also the multiplicity of the levels of language 
mentioned above (not reducible only to the semantic dimension), the 
theoretical opposition between interpretation and relation and the 
clinical opposition between interpreting and containing is then 
abandoned. This is a fundamental and widely shared point, to which 
many currents of psychoanalysis have arrived by their own and 
diversified paths, but which can find significant support from the 
hermeneutic perspective.  
It is interesting that the psychoanalyst Thomas Ogden (2019) has 
recently proposed to differentiate between two distinct models, in 
constant interaction with each other, which he has called with happy 
intuition epistemological and ontological, the first centred on 
knowledge, the second on being and becoming. 
The psychoanalyst inspired by hermeneutics is undoubtedly 
situated in this second aspect in which the word, language and 
translation open up to being and in particular to “co-existence” and aim 
at becoming, at the transformation of unbearable suffering into 
bearable suffering. On this path, both hermeneutics and 
psychoanalysis are configured as a kind of bridge that connects the 
shore of the emotional (especially that part of the emotions that cannot 
tolerate or cannot reach the word) with the shore of language, which 
opens up the possibility of narrative, self-acceptance and the 
construction of identity.   
 
Giuseppe Martini 
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